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The Euthanasia Debate in the Netherlands:
Biolegal, Bioethical and Biotheological Considerations
By
Sr. Teresa A. Takken, Ph.D.
Director, The Pacific Institute for Bioethics
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Euthanasia has been the subject of
intense and extensive debate in The
Netherlands ever since 1952, and recently within the United States of AlT)erica.
The biolegal aspects of the debate as it
has developed in The Netherlands provide substantial bases for bioethical
examination. Yet, where bioethical and
philosophical conundrums, biomedical
technologies and biolegal technicalities
lead us in circles, biotheological considerations enter the arena to call believing
people to act upon and live out in fact
their programs and articulations of faith.
A substantial number of USA media
presentations of the situation in The
Netherlands use the terms "mercy-killing" and "euthanasia" interchangeably,
and suggest that euthanasia there has
been legalized. Euthanasia has not been
legalized in that country, nor in any country of the world. Euthanasia has been the
subject of intense and extensive debate
in The Netherlands ever since 1952. The
pivotal Leeuwarden and Rotterdam
cases in 1973 and 1981, respectively,
have received particular attention arising
from the request of a patient to have
his/her life terminated and/or assistance
. in suicide.
The Dutch define "euthanasia" as
"the intentional termination of life by
another party at the persistent and
repeated request of the person con-

cerned." "Mercy-killing," distinct from
euthanasia, denotes involuntary killing of
patients and maintains the emotional,
psychological and social link to the practices of the Third Reich in the 1930s and
early 1940s.
Because of the mass confusion surrounding the definition of euthanasia in
the USA, it is perhaps important to clarify
what euthanasia is NOT:
i) actions to withhold or suspend
treatment at the explicit and earnest
request of the patient;
ii) actions to withhold or suspend
treatment in cases where such
treatment is deemed pointless
according to prevailing medical
opinion;
iii) failure to treat a secondary illness or
disorder in the case of a patient who,
according to prevailing medical
opinion, has irreversibly lost
consciousness;
iv) hastening death as a secondary
effect of treatment which is itself
specifically designed to relieve suffering on the part of the patient and
which is essential for that purpose.
In 1981, the Court of Rotterdam lifted
the punishment imposed upon one who
assists another to die and permitted the
phYSician in that case to go unpunished
for administering a lethal injection to a

patient who had requested death based
upon nine strict criteria which were met:
1) There must be psychological or
physical suffering that through the
expression of the supplicant is
stated to be an experience which is
intolerable and insufferable;
2) The experience of suffering itself
and the desire to die must be durable and perSistent;
3) The decision to die is established to
be completely voluntary on the part
of the patient/supplicant;
4) The supplicant must have a reasonable understanding of his/her situation and of all possible alternatives;
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she/he must be in such a state as to
weigh the options and alternatives,
and must have completed this process upon requesting physicianassistance to die;
There must be no other reasonable
solution apparent to improve the
situation;
The decision to provide assistance
to die may not be determined by
only one person;
There must always be present a
physician who is responsible for the
prescription of the method eventually used (e.g ., lethal injection);
There must be no unnecessary
distress brought upon any others
involved;
With the decision toward the assistance to die, as'Weil as with the performance of the act itself, the greatest possible care must be observed.

Since January, 1987, the Dutch government has held that the existing prohibition of euthanasia not be lifted since no
one should be exempt from prosecution
for performing euthanasia. Present Dutch
legislation construes termination of life
upon request as murder or manslaughter, subject to mitigating circumstances
of the request. Physicians who terminate
the life of a patient based upon an earnest, repeated, consistent, expressed and
rational request on the part of the patient,
are guilty of a criminal offense under article 293 of the Penal Code and render
themselves thereby liable to prosecution
and punishment. Yet, a physician may
invoke force majeur (necessity) and
be immune from punishment only if
the above-cited sedulous requirements
are met.

The above nine were expanded in
drafts of March 26 and December 11,
1987, to include the following, presently
holding 17 strict criteria:

Key elements of the euthanasia debate
have to do more with bioethical scrutinization than with biomedical or biolegal:
for example, that a disease is said to be
incurable, that a terminal stage has been
reached, that a patient will die within a
certain time period, that a patient suffers
unbearable pain, or that a situation has
become untenable. In addition to these
examples, there are other bioethical
issues in the debate which deserve
mention.
First, the USA distinction between socalled active and passive euthanasia is
based upon the difference between acting and om itting. However, in the legal
forum , acting is the same as omitting if
acting is considered to be a duty in a
given situation. It is precisely the determination of when one must act, and how
far one must go in acting to save the life
of another that is in question here. In the
USA " saving" is usually translated into
" prolonging life" and "protracting death,"
and perhaps there lies the key. Also central in this discussion is the insistent
request of the patient, which then constitutes inaction as a legitimate refusal of
medical treatment on the part of the
patient. The phrase "passive euthanasia" is found to be not only useless but
even hazardous; it could suggest that the
termination of the life of a patient by
omission of treatment without that
patient's express request would be an
acceptable manner of euthanasia.
Next, incurability is scientifically not
well defined, and as a criterion itself
would cause problems. For instance,
would a healthy diabetic be eligible for
euthanasia as opposed to a victim of a
severe accident who has no incurable
disease?

5)

6)

7)

8)

9)

10) The physician must personally notify the Public Prosecutor that he/she
has terminated the life of a patient or
assisted the patient in the taking of
his/her own life;
11) The notification must be accompanied by a statement of the manner in
which the criteria specified in the
Criminal Code had been taken into
account;
12) The Public Prosecutor shall also be
handed a declaration setting forth
the findings of the independent physician consulted by the attending
physician;
13) The independent physician must be
chosen from the special state listing,
to ensure noncollaboration in a
criminal action;
14) The attending physician must advise personally the Registrar of
Births, Deaths and Marriages, in all
instances of death from unnatural
causes;
15) Funeral arrangements could be
made only if the Public Prosecutor
issues a certificate of no objection to
burial or cremation;
16) The physician in charge must refer
to the fact of euthanasia as the
cause of death when completing the
cause-of-death form;
17) The physician is mandated to log
each event in a journal which would
be open to public scrutiny and held
for at least five years from the date
the patient first expressed a request
to receive physician-assisted death.
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Bioethical Considerations

Thirdly, there is a distinction between
medical acts, and social acts in which
doctors are involved. Medical acts are
judged upon the basis of professiona/
standards set forth by the medical profession itself; for judgments upon a
social-ethical action such as euthanasia, no medical professional norms exist.
Physicians disagree on euthanasia and
this disagreement demonstrates the
nature of the subject: bioethical and
biomoral, biotheological and, in part,
biolegal.
Next, if euthanasia becomes legalized
for tighter control, public scrutiny and
greater protection from possible abuse,
then the discussion could cease and the
debate be considered over. The debate
in its roots and origins is important to
maintain for at least two reasons: euthanasia appears to be the "treatment" for a
disease of which we as a society do
not know the origin or the "diagnosis"!
Western society needs to steer slowly
through the storms of such a vital debate;
important nuances are overlooked when
we move too fast.
Fifth, the increasing awareness of
personal autonomy is central to bioethical discussion today, and to the euthanasia debate in particular. How farextending are individual rights? Do these
include the end of life? Is the end of life
part of life?
Continued on page 8
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WHAT CAN WE LEARN?
By
Donald R. Tredway, M.D., Ph.D.
Reproductive Endocrinology and Infertility
Department of Obstetrics and Gynecology
School of Medicine
Lorna Linda University
The important court case which prompted us to choose this
topic comes out of Tennessee in 1989. Mary Sue Davis and her
husband Junior Lewis Davis had produced seven embryos in
vitro, and these had been preserved by freezing. Then the couple
Jivorced, and a question arose as to the disposition of the
embryos. Mrs. Davis desired to carry one of the embryos to term
and have the baby. Her ex-husband disagreed. The question
was, what should be done? As many of us are aware, the court
decided that not just seven embryos, but seven human beings,
were involved.
In vitro fertilization is a couple-related problem. It takes place in
glass or within the test tube or petri dish. In vitro fertilization first
occurred in 1978 in England with Steptoe and Edwards who
achieved the first human birth resulting from IVF. They had previously tried 500 times unsuccessfully. A group in Australia, under
the leadership of Trowsend in Melbourne, started using stimulated
cycles to produce multiple eggs. Their first birth resulted from that
procedure in 1981. In the United States, the Jones Institute at
Norfolk, Virginia, achieved the first birth from in vitro procedures in
this century.
Several different in vitro treatment protocols are used. One of
these employs serophene and pergonal. The major point with a
treatment protocol is to try to get more than one oocyte or follicle to
develop. In the normal cycle we'd usually have one to two follicles
develop. During the time of administration of the drugs we do
intensive monitoring with various steroids to measure the daily
estrogen. In this situation we 're also measuring gonadotropin (a
hormone produced by the pituitary gland to make sure that we
have total control of the cycle). Then, when we think that we have
reached the size and level that we desire, we give a final shot to
produce natural ovulation within 36 hours. Shortly before this
occurs, we take the patient to the operating room and retrieve the
oocytes, the eggs, by various methods. The patient is maintained
>n exogenous hormones during this time.
In our facility we're doing a retrieval under vaginal-directed
ultrasound. The follicular fluid is given to the embryologist, who is
looking for the oocytes. Hopefully she will tell us that she has found

a nice, mature oocyte (an egg with an expanded acumulus mass) .
Once the eggs are preincubated for a period of time, insemination
takes place and in the insemination media the oocytes are placed
within an incubator for fertilization to occur.
Let's say that in this case, a couple of days later an embryo has
developed-perhaps an 8-cell embryo. With the embryos in
place, we 've used a little device to transfer the embryo or embryos
into the uterus. After this we wait two weeks, while the patient is on
exogenous hormones, to see if pregnancy occurs.
According to the National Registry, there were fewe r
than 15,000 cases of in vitro fertilization in the United States in
1987. The success rate per cycle is low-only an average of 16
percent. In individual situations and institutions you can get as
high as 25 or 30 percent, but the overall average is 16. Also, recall
in a normal cycle with no problems between husband and wife
is 25 to 30 percent.
When we first started doing in vitro fertilization, we would try to
transfer more than one embryo. The pregnancy rate did increase,
but reached a point where multiple gestation occurs. Not long ago
we were transferring eight and ten embryos, but then we had a
high rate of multiple gestation, resulting in premature labor or
miscarriages. At present, most programs will use only three or four
embryos, at the most five. After that multiple gestations increase. If
we have multiple embryos we may end up with ten or twelve of
them. If we put back three or four, what do we do with the others?
That's how cryopreservation has come into mode. Theoretically, if
we freeze the embryos and if they survive a freezing and thawing
episode, we could come back in a normal non-stimulated cycle
and transfer those embryos back and have pregnancy occur.

"The court decided that not just seven
embryos, but seven human beings, were
involved."
Unfortunately, with the current status of cryopreservation the
overall pregnancy rate per cycle is only eight percent. Pregnancies are accumulative, so that we may be able to get enough
embryos to take a patient through three or four cycles, with a
cumUlative pregnancy rate that would be higher at a lesser
cost.The average cost for IVF per cycle will vary from one institution to another, but it is usually from $5,000 to $8,000 per cycle.
In medicine we have many debates about abortion and the
rights of the full-fledged fetus. Now we have introduced another
area-the embryo. With these new reproductive procedures,
we're dealing with all sorts of ethical considerations. In the Davis
case, the biological characteristics of the pre-embryo and its

3

moral and legal status are involved, and we must deal also with the
subject of cryopreservation of embryos.
A pre-embryo is defined as the period of development from the
end ofthe fertilization process to when we have the appearance of
the primitive streak. During the firstfourteen days of life, iffertilization occurs, the cells divide and go up through implantation. At the
fourteenth day we will have the primitive streak. There's a difference among scientists as to the significance of this time period.
Let's look at some of the characteristics that we know from the
embryonic standpoint.
During these first fourteen days of development, trophoblasts will
dominate and nourish the subsequent embryo, so that most of the
cells are not the embryo but cells nourishing the embryo. An
individual may not develop at all because there is a high rate of
spontaneous miscarriage or abortion during this stage. Two preembryos may even fuse to form a single individual.
Some scientists have considered it proper to experiment on life
during this time period because a Single biological individual has
not developed untirthe fourteenth day. However, newer data on
gene transcription (DNA and RNA goes from one progeny to
another) show that it is present and activated at least by the
four-cell stage. So we can debate how we determine what life is.
Here we have reflected a couple-related problem. From the
standpOint of a group of Christian physicians, we feel that in vitro
fertilization with the husband's sperm and wife 's eggs is acceptable. We have difficulty speaking with certainty about cryopreservation, but we do accept certain guidelines. One is that husband
and wife should agree beforehand on the disposition of all leftover
frozen embryos, if the wife becomes pregnant. An informed consent policy for cryopreservation is being considered in its final
form before the Institutional Review Board. In the Davis case no
prearrangement was made. This consent form tries to fully inform
the couple of different options and situations that can occur. We
are doing cryopreservation mainly to avoid multiple pregnancies
from transferring all of the embryos.
Legal rights and status of the frozen embryos have not been
fully determined. Because both husband and wife are participants,
any decisions regarding the disposition of embryos must be made
by mutual consent. If the couple is unable to reach a mutual
decision, the court must determine the disposition of the embryos.
Various situations can occur: the death of the wife, the death of the
husband, divorce, etc. The couple, prior to starting cryopreservation of embryos, must agree on the possible disposition of
the embryos.

"As a scientist, I feel that I cannot make a
morphological determination on the basis of
rights of this pre-embryo that could be life."

In a recent court case a physician refused to transfer embryos to
another facility. This resulted in creation of a permit to release the
embryos to another institution. Even where there are multiple
permits, the couple may still have to appear in court to petition for
the disposition of the embryos.
The American Fertility Society puttogether an ethics committee
which went through all of these technologies and made various
recommendations. They could not agree on everything, but with
regard to the type of case being discussed here, "We find a wide
consensus that the pre-embryo is not a person, but is to be treated
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with special respect because it is a genetically unique, living
human entity that might become a person."
From a scientific standpoint, this ruling is contrary to the court
ruling in the Davis case. However, the committee admitted in (
footnote that this statement offers little guidance because there
are no ethical or legal conclusions offered with regard to the
pre-embryo.
Where does life begin as a pre-embryo and as an individual?
Does the pre-embryo have rights? In the State of Louisiana the
pre-embryo has rights. As a scientist, I feel that I cannot make a
morpholog ical determination on the basis of rights of this preembryo that could be life. A moral, biological and legal decision
must be made to guide the scientific community.

A LEGAL PERSPECTIVE
By
Andrea K. Scott, J.D.
Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy (Los Angeles)
As autumn color tinged the Maryville, Tennessee, countryside
last year, a young couple in the throes of a divorce could not agree
on the disposition of their seven cryogenically preserved embryos,
the product of in vitro fertilization. In Davis v. Davis ("Davis")1, a
decision that may alter the course of biotechnology and the law,
JudgeW. Dale Young ruled that human life begins at conception
and that cryogenically preserved embryos-or preembryos,
prezygotes and zygotes-are juridical persons, or human beings
with legal status.
In so holding, Judge Young set a number of legal precedent~
First, by extending legal status to a conceptus or embryo, Judge
Young exceeded the Supreme Court's Roe v. Wade 2 framework,
which stands for the proposition that the interests of the mother
outweigh those of a fetus during the first trimester of pregnancy.
During these first three months, abortion for any reason is legal.
Interestingly, the Davis ruling also contravenes the Tennessee
Wrongful Death Statute 3 , which states that an unborn child is
accorded juridical status only if it is "viable" at the time ofthe injury.
Viability refers to the ability of a fetus to survive outside the womb,
with life support if necessary. Even the Tennessee Criminal Abortion Statute 4 does not extend legal status to a fetus until the fourth
month of the mother's pregnancy. Moreover, as Judge Young
noted, no state in the union has to date "established a public policy
declaring the [legal] rights to be accorded to a human embryo, in
vitro, in a divorce case "5.
Does this mean that embryos which are overtly destroyed or
which perish from unintentionally being left in cryogenic storage
too long have been murdered either by the parents or those in
charge of the storage facility? The judiciary has not yet answered
this question. One case from New York, however, sheds some
light on judicial thinking about the emerging practice of in vitro
fertilization. In Del Zio v. Presbyterian Hospita/6 , in which embryos
produced by in vitro fertilization were destroyed by a physician
lacking institutional authority, ajury awarded the biological mother
$50,000 for emotional distress. Significantly, the jury did not
recognize the mother's ownership of the embryos. Similarly, the
Del Zio Court neither considered the embryos to be the mother's
property nor recognized the embryos to be children or juridical
persons.
(
Second, in holding that a conceptus or embryo in vitro is a child
rather than a "potential person, " as Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor-the only Supreme Court Judge ever to have been
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pregnant-has termed them, Judge Young enabled the court to
act as parens patriae, or the ultimate guardian of a child's welfare?
When a court acts in the capacity of parens patriae, it is em'Dowered to take whatever action it deems necessary in "the best
interest" of the child, even when such actions starkly conflict with
the parents' claim of custody. In the Davis case, Judge Young
ruled that the interests of the seven embryos would be best served
by giving them into the custody of Mrs. Davis, who said she wished
to have them all implanted and brought to full term. Mr. Davis did
not want them implanted in Mrs. Davis or donated (anonymously)
to a fertility clinic. Rather, Junior Davis preferred to maintain the
embryos indefinitely in a cryogenically frozen state, alleging that
any other dispositon of the embryos would amount to a " raping of
reproductive rights"6.
Specifically, Judge Young objected to Mr. Davis' intention to
keep the embryos frozen indefinitely, holding that, "to allow cryogenically preserved human embryos to remain so preserved for a
period exceeding two years is tantamount to the destruction of
these human beings."9 Are we to interpret Judge Young's comment to mean that M( Davis would be committing either murder or
manslaughter by leaving the embryos in storage for more than two
years? Hypothetically speaking, if twenty ova were culled from a
woman and fertilized with her husband's sperm in an effort to
ensure pregnancy using in vitro techniques, would Judge Young
rule that the woman either must have each embryo implanted and
possibly bear far more children than she (or her husband) wish to
have, or must donate the unused embryos to strangers? If the
woman does not wish to bear more than, say, three children or to
donate the remaining embryos to a "bank", will she be guilty of
murder or manslaughter by leaving them in storage too long?
Third, Judge Young firmly rejected the concept that the embryos
are fungible property, or indeed property of any kind lO . His ratioale for this unequivocal ruling is that "human life begins at conception" with the gametic union of female ova and male sperm.
This ruling is at odds with considerable modern legal thought. For
example, extracorporeal bodily fluids such as blood and sperm
historically have been treated as property belonging to the individual who produced them. In California, the judiciary has taken the
notion of extracorporeal body parts as property one step further. In
Moore v. Regents of The University of California 11 , in which doctors used biological materials from one of their patients to develop
a patented product, an appellate court held that persons who give
biological material to medical institutions for use or discard retain
property rights over that material. Under Judge Young's ruling in
the Davis case, couples may begin to forfeit to the courts control
over their own genetic materials and progeny.

"No less true than the legal adage that
'hard cases make bad law' is the observation that personal dilemmas make
bad ethics."
Does Judge Young's ruling stand for the proposition that the
judiciary is empowered to dictate how many children a couple
must have because birth is in the "best interest" of their embryos?
Or that the courts may order Mr. and Mrs. John Doe to give up their
embryos to anonymous recipients rather than leave them in cryogenic storage until they (Mr. and Mrs. Doe) are physically, emotionally and financially capable of raising more than the one, two or
three children which resulted from initial in vitro procedures?
Although it would be premature for anyone to attempt to answer
these questions at this time, society must choose answers in the

nearfuture.lfthe public does nottake responsibility for answering
these questions by popular mandate, through elected officials, the
courts will be forced to answer them by judicial fiat.
Along with the gifts of biotechnological innovation come
unprecedented and daunting ethical quandaries. In vitro fertilization is a physically, emotionally and financially draining experience
for any couple; although it is the woman who undergoes the
debilitating medical procedures, her mate and the marriage itself
also suffer considerable stress. That divorce sometimes results
from such marital difficulties is not surprising. To lay blame at the
Davis' doorstep, or on those of couples like them, serves no useful
social function . Rather, such couples should be encouraged to
apply common sense principles and planning to their encounter
with biotechnology. What might the Davises have done differently? At a minimum, they might have conferred with a family
planning expert or domestic relations attorney in an effort to formulate a written consent document making clear their mutual wishes
in the event that (1) one or both parents changed their minds about
having ch,ildren; (2) a divorce were to occur; (3) one or both parents
were to become severely disabled; and (4) one or both parents
were to die.
The common law has devoted centuries and innumerable
tomes to the subject of future interests, or the disposition of a
deceased individual's property. Where does in vitro fertilization fit
in the extant scheme of estate law? For example, in the event of
the genetic parents' death, what would become of the cryogenically preserved embryos which Judge Young pronounced to be
children? Could they be given to one surrogate (gestational)
mother, or to a series of surrogate mothers in case the first one
wanted only a single child? Could those embryos, once born alive,
inherit their genetic parents' estate even though they were not
born at the time of their parents' intestate or testamentary demise?
Could an embryo inherit the parents' wealth, taking precedence
over a child born to one of the parents years earlier? Could
the surrogate parents of an embryonic child receive any part of
the estate?
By way of illustration, consider the case of Elsa and Mario Rios,
who in 1983 died intestate in a plane crash shortly after travelling
to Melbourne, Australia, for in vitro fertilization procedures. In addition to an $8 million dollar estate, they left a child in California from
Mr. Rios' former marriage and two cryogenically frozen embryos
in Australia. In 1987, facing a politically sensitive situation, the
Victoria state parliament adopted special legislation directing that
the Rios' orphan embryos be kept frozen until suitable surrogate
mothers could be found. Further, the parliament ordered that
neither the embryos nor the surrogate mothers could receive any
share of the Rios' estate 12 . By way of a state law requiring that a
child beneficiary be born alive or be in utero at the time of the
parental death, the California judiciary similarly disqualified the
orphan embryos from laying any claim to the Rios ' wealth
in future 13.
Perhaps no less true than the legal adage that "hard cases
make bad law" is the observation that personal dilemmas make
bad ethics. The Davis case presents just such a dilemma for Mary
Sue and Junior Lewis Davis, for the judiciary, for society at large.
As a system, the common law evolves; its certitudes emerge from
the frothy wake of societal change and technological innovation.
Judge Young's ruling in Davis v. Davis may stand or it may be
overturned. The judiciary in states other than Tennessee mayor
may not follow Judge Young's reasoning. Regardless of the specific fate that befalls the Davis ruling, one of the most important
lessons to be learned from this case is that we, individually and
collectively, must make hard choices for ourselves. Each individual has the freedom and the power to choose according to his
or her personal beliefs what course the law should take in matters
as innately private as reproduction. One can exercise that choice
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through the political process, by communicating with elected
representatives, or one can remain silent. In the face of such
passivity, the law will surely evolve-possibly in ways that undermine medical progress and the advancement of biotechnologyby judical fiat.
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SOME THOUGHTS
REGARDING FROZEN
EMBRYOS AND DIVORCE
By
Madelynn Jones Haldeman, Th.O.
Lorna Linda University Riverside
School of Religion
This paper is a reflection on the decision made by the judge who
adjudicated the case of Mary Sue Davis and the frozen embryos
belonging to both Mary Sue and her ex-husband Junior L. Butthe
area for discussion hangs on the word potential, as used by the
judge in his declaration on the fate of the embryos. The only
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difference, according to the judge, between an embryo and a
person is simply that the embryo is a potential human being
whereas the other is a human being. The embryo has instructions
on how and when to develop.
(
It would appear that the innate instructions on how to develop
into a human being become less and less intricate as each cell
progresses. However, when the unborn child is born into the
world, it also needs external instructions and care in order for it to
continue developing into a living human being. And this point
seems to be a most important one. A child without external instructions from a parent does not develop its human image, so it is not
correct to say that a child born into this world is a developed
human being. Rather, it has the potential for developing into a full
human being. Unless a child is given the proper environment,
trained with the correct instructions, both of which must be provided to the child before it reaches puberty, the human image will
not and perhaps cannot become fully developed. Each stage of its
development moves the potential human being closer to its goal of
being a developed human being. Therefore, a zygote, embryo,
fetus, or born child, each as a potential human being, represents a
different stage in the developmental process.

"Who is guilty if all the frozen embryos are
not utilized before the two years go by?"
The judge in this case decided that anything that is potentially a
human being has the right to have the opportunity to come to full
term, or to say it another way, it has the right to progress in its
development. This right that has been invested in an undeveloped
embryo can be nullified, it has been argued, in the matter of
abortion. But there is another right that has to be considered: the
right of the woman, as a fully developed human being, to decide
whether she wants her body entered and made the place of abode
for a developing embryo or fetus. This developed human being, by
virtue of her anatomy and also her ability to make choices regarding her own person, has a prior right to be exercised-prior to the
right of that which is termed a potential human being.
The right belonging to the potential human being has been
declared to exist by fiat of fully developed human beings, but the
potential human being cannot exercise a right above that of the
fully developed human being, because the right to develop does
not precede the right of permission for a place of development.
Otherwise, the female fully developed human being cannot exercise her right as an instructed fully developed human being to
make choices. Thus the potential human being has more rights
than the fully developed. Adults are being dictated to by what is not
a fully developed human being. In the issue of abortion, these
premises are rarely addressed. When they are discussed, the
principle of life has prior importance over a fully developed
female's right to make a choice about the development of life.
In the matter of divorce, then, what can be said about the right of
the embryo? Does the potential human being have any rights at
all? Does this right have more weight than any other consideration? Do couples who have zygotes frozen for future use have a
responsibility to them even after their particular union is broken by
divorce? The judge in this case thought so: A potential human
being must be given the right to become all that it is instructed to
become. This is the same argument as in the abortion issue.
There are, however, other rights that cannot be ignored. The
father has a right of choice, and he chooses to refuse to give thE'
embryo any further opportunity for development, because the
marriage has ended. I believe that the father has a right for choice
also. The real question is, does the father have the right to change

his mind? Originally, he was in full agreement with the wife that
embryos be prepared for development. But circumstances altered
his original choice. Can it be argued, then, that since the embryo is
'\,Iy a potential human being, the choice of a developed human
6eing, the husband in this case, should be considered above the
embryo's so-called right to develop? The judge did not think so.
The issue now appears to be whether the woman's choice is
prior to the husband's choice. I believe that two must agree on the
principle of wanting children. If the husband in a legal marriage
wants children and the woman does not, it is my opinion that the
woman's choice regarding whether her body may be used as an
incubator has a prior right to that of her husband. However, if the
husband does not wish to have children, the woman's right of
choice regarding her bOdy is not the right under consideration.
Rather, the wanting of the child must be agreed on before any
other consideration. Therefore, I disagree with the decision of the
judge who awarded the embryos to the mother.
If one takes the position that because an embryo is a potential
human being and therefore has a right to develop, regardless of
the choice of developed human beings, the utilitarian ethic of
aspirating many ova at one time to cut down on financial and
emotional traumas is unacceptable. Therefore, I would be
opposed to IVF if one accedes to the ethic that potential can be
equated with fully developed. Only one ovum at a time should be
aspirated regardless ofthe pain or cost. And ifthis embryo has the
right to develop, what does one do with the nurse who spills the
embryo when she trips and falls down while carrying the embryo to
the doctor for imbedding in the uterus of a patient? Is she accused
of murder? And who is guilty if all the frozen embryos are not
utilized before the two years go by?

against IVF on the basis of the human element making mistakes,
such as in the case of a nurse who trips and spills the embryos,
does not lend itself in the argument for or against the IVF process.
But there is a difference between making a human mistake in the
process of IVF and disposing ofthe embryos deliberately because
the marriage is over. One act is unpremeditated and the other is
meditated. Of course, people can be paid to trip and fall while
caring for the embryos, or people can find all kinds of excuses for
not using the embryos-excuses that might be acceptable in court.
It would seem to me that if one argues that the embryo is a
potential human being and, therefore, has a right to development,
then the medical profession is ethically bound to protect its
embryos from annihilation by human error as much as is possible
and to question the ethics of multiple aspirations. If, of course, one
argues that a potential human being and a developed human
being are not at all the same thing, it simply does not matter
whether the IV solution is spilled or ifthe embryos are disposed of
deliberately. However, I find the utilitarian principle unacceptable if
one predicates that the embryo is a potential human being and that
potential, defined as having innate instructions, is equivalent to the
developed human. Mistakes are part of the human existence, but
having a surplus of embryos and not knowing what to do with them
seems an untenable position. Based on the position of the judge in
this case, I would have to cast my vote against IVF, or at least,
against multiple aspirations of ova at one time. On the other hand,
if one can reasonably conclude that the potential human being is
subject to the rights of the developed human beings, then the
judge in this case created a tempest in a teapot, and the right of the
ex-husband must be considered of prime importance.

"Do couples who have zygotes frozen for
future· use have a responsibility to them
even after their particular union is broken
by divorce?"
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The issue of a utilitarian ethic seems to be part of the entire
problem. The monetary expense to the couple and the emotional
and physical trauma to the woman in particular provide a reasonable premise for obtaining a number of embryos at one time. But
embryos cannot exist very long unless they are frozen. This process is called cryopreservation and provides the embryos with
approximately a two-year period of potential life. But the question
remains regarding the leftover embryos. What are to be done with
these? If these embryos are indeed potential human beings, it
appears imprudent and unethical to dispose of them, or for that
matter, to have any excess of them.
And now, to go one step further in this discussion. Perhaps one
way to solve the dilemma of extra embryos would be to make men
and women declare under oath before they are marrie.d to each
other that they will become responsible for all embryos, whether
they stay married or get divorced.
Another problem arises if one accepts that the embryo is potentiallya human being: There is no guarantee that a human error will
'lot occur to this potential human. Of course, in all of our treatment
:the human body, no one can guarantee that mistakes will not be
made and human beings will not forfeit their lives. Thus, in every
medical treatment there is a risk to be taken because of the human
potential for making mistakes. So it would appear that to argue

Health-Care Professionals With AIDS:

A Patient's Right to Know?
Medicine and the Aging of America
Blood Transfusions: A Patient's Right to Refuse?
Technologies of Human Reproduction: Ethical Issues
The Religious Liberty of Parents vs.
The Medical Rights of Children

Audio and Video Cassettes available by writing :
Sigma Audio/Video Associates
Tom Saknit
Audio Tapes . . $7.00
po. Box 51
Video Tapes . $15.00
Lorna Linda, CA 92354
(714) 796-3232
7

1991
Loma Linda University
School of Medicine
Annual Postgraduate Convention
Saturday
February 23
6:30-7:30 p.m.

Tuesday
February 26
10:00-11:00 a.m.

Tuesday
February 26
7:45 a.m. - 3:45 p.m.

Jack W. Provonsha
lectureship

Percy T. Magan Memorial
lectureship

Bioethlcs
Symposium

"The Secularization of
Medical Ethics"

"Between Life and Death:
The Life Support Dilemma"

"Clinical Medical Ethics
Today: Concepts & Cases"

Mark Siegler, M.D.

Kenneth Schemmer, M.D.

Robert Orr, M.D.

Director, Center ·for Clinical Ethics
University of Chicago

Surgeon
Brea, California

Director of Clinical Ethics
Loma Linda University
Medical Center

Netherlands -

continued

Sixth, in the USA the popular trend is
one of "procedural bioethics": contractual relationships between voluntarily
consenting adults. The securing of contracts, the negotiation of procedures and
protocols, and the espousal of one or two
bioethical principles to the exclusion of
important others, creates an atmosphere
of fragmentation, abandonment and isolation of individuals in need; an imbalance between the individual and the
community. The lack of concern for the
content and substance of such contracts,
for example, leans toward superficiality.
Next, we must ask if it makes sense
that we consider putting an end to the
suffering of a person by putting an end to
the sufferer?-that medical instruments
have become "weapons" aimed at the
well-being of the patient which hit the
bearer of the disease, instead of
the disease?
Not last and not least, should euthanasia be legalized because of our social
ills? Have we no room for each other
psychologically, emotionally, spiritually?
Have we not enough reserves to
accompany each other to the edges
of life? Are we so unused to suffering
and to suffering-with in our sufferingfree society?

Biotheological
Considerations
But now enter moral theology, or, in the
case of euthanasia and the life-dilemmas, biotheology. The field of pastoral
medicine, the precursor to contemporary
medical ethics, enters where bioethical
and philosophical conundrums, biomedical technologies and biolegal technicalities lead us in circles. What is lacking in
the euthanasia debate is the dynamic
notion of God-with-us. Taking this view, I
assert that suffering, in, of and for itself
remains meaningless. Our struggle
against and amidst it is not nonsense,
however, but is urgent and necessary. I
further propose that God does not will,
allow or permit suffering, since God is
first and foremost all-loving. God, the loving parent and initiator of grace, creates,
warms, transforms, lightens, enlightens,
encourages and empowers humanity to
conquer suffering by going right through
it! God is the inspiration of our efforts to
relieve suffering as the ultimate nonviolent power: the One who empowers
us and strengthens us to endure.
Here, God is the and yet, still talking,
when death thinks it has had the final say
on life. Jesus, the Crucified-but-Alive-
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One, struggles with us in our efforts
against suffering as the Immanuel: Godwith-us. Jesus of the Gospels comes to
do something about it, real and present,
as the compassionate, empathetic One;
as one who died because of us and rosp
in spite of us-to continue living for u~

Conclusion
America is desperately seeking an
ethic which may speak with some sense
of rational authority across the diversity
of faith, opinion and world view which is
at once the agony as well as the ecstasy
of the American Dream. Because many
of us Americans who claim to be people
of faith have not acted in fact upon our
articulated words and programs of
faith, we all suffer today as legislation
is proposed which requests putting an
end to suffering by putting an end to the
life ofthe sufferer. The Real Presence we
claim must be lived in reality: standing
by, in, through, and with each other,
being-with, really present to and for
each other.

Note: Translation of all Dutch/Flemish
materials in this text by author.
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